Threat Analysis Group, LLCon





Archive for category Crime Prevention

Date: April 12th, 2013
Cate: Crime Prevention

Ingenuity by Burglar

“DALWORTHINGTON GARDENS — The discovery of a hidden camera may help solve a series of break-ins at upscale homes in several North Texas cities.

“This one has already been camouflaged,” said detective Ben Singleton, holding what looks like a piece of bark that would go unnoticed in most yards.

It’s actually a video camera not much bigger than a matchbox, and it’s activated by a motion detector. Such cameras turned up in March planted outside several upscale homes in Dalworthington Gardens.”

Technology enhances life.  Everyone innovates.  Everyone.

Link to full article

Date: November 9th, 2012
Cate: Crime Prevention, Terrorism

Possible indicators of terrorist activity in hotels

Known or possible terrorists have displayed suspicious behaviors while staying at hotels overseas—including avoiding questions typically asked of hotel registrants; showing unusual interest in hotel security; attempting access to restricted areas; and evading hotel staff. These behaviors also could be observed in U.S. hotels, and security and law enforcement personnel should be aware of the potential indicators of terrorist activity.

 

Department of Homeland Security’s list of possible indicators of terrorist activities in hotels

Date: July 21st, 2012
Cate: Crime Prevention, Research/Studies, Security

A Primer on Place-Based Crime Prevention

“Criminologists and crime prevention practitioners are increasingly aware of the importance of places of crime. A place is a very small area, usually a street corner, address, building, or street segment. A focus on crime places contrasts with a focus on neighborhoods. Neighborhood theories usually highlight the development of offenders, while place level explanations emphasize crime events. Three perspectives suggest the importance of places for understanding crime: rational choice; routine activity theory; and crime pattern theory. Though these perspectives are mutually supportive, routine activity theory and crime pattern theory provide different explanations for crime occurring at different places. Five areas of research help us understand the importance of places: crime concentration about particular facilities (e.g., bars); the high concentration of crime at some addresses and the absence of crime at others; the preventive effects of various place features; the mobility of offenders; and studies of how offenders select targets. Concern has been expressed that efforts to prevent crime at specific locations will only move it to other unprotected locations. Recent research suggests that these fears may be exaggerated, and that under some circumstances the opposite effect occurs: instead of crime displacing, the benefits of the prevention efforts diffuse to unprotected locations. This paper concludes with a review of the 14 original articles in this volume.”

Crime Prevention Studies Volume 4:  Crime and Place

Date: February 21st, 2012
Cate: Crime Prevention

Understanding Risky Facilities

Building on their past research on situational crime prevention, Drs. Clarke and Eck explain the concept of risky facilities in this paper.

Introduction

In any large city just a handful of bars give the police far more trouble than all the rest put together. The same is true of many other types of establishments, such as schools, convenience stores, and parking lots. In each case, just a few produce far more crime, disorder, and calls for police assistance than the rest of the group combined. This phenomenon—called “risky facilities”—has important implications for many problem-oriented policing projects. In particular, it can help police focus their energies where they are needed most and can help in selecting appropriate preventive measures. This guide serves as an introduction to risky facilities and shows how the concept can aid problem-oriented policing efforts by providing answers to the following key questions.

1. What are risky facilities?
2. How widespread are risky facilities?
3. How is the concept of risky facilities different from hot spots and repeat victimization?
4. How can the concept of risky facilities assist problem-oriented policing projects?
5. How can risk be measured?
6. How is the concentration of risk among facilities calculated?
7. Why do facilities vary in risk?
8. How are risk factors identified for a particular group of facilities?
9. How can risk be reduced?

 

Understanding Risky Facilities (PDF)

Date: September 29th, 2011
Cate: Crime Prevention, Research/Studies

Study says Real-Time Monitored Public Surveillance Cameras are Effective

“Between 2007 and 2010, researchers from the Urban Institute’s Justice Policy Center studied public surveillance systems in Baltimore, Chicago, and Washington, D.C., to measure the extent of their use, their effects on crime, their other benefits, and their costs. While results varied by area, surveillance systems in Baltimore and Chicago produced more than enough benefits to justify their costs. No cost-benefit analysis was conducted in Washington, D.C., because the cameras didn’t show a statistically significant impact on crime there.”

Unlike other recent studies on cameras, the Urban Institute researched monitored surveillance systems, a key factor in overall effectiveness.

 

Urban Institute Study

 

Date: August 30th, 2011
Cate: Crime Prevention

Super Controllers and Crime Prevention

Security Journal has an excellent article entitled:  Super controllers and crime prevention: A routine activity explanation of crime prevention success and failure.

Why does crime prevention fail? And under what conditions does it succeed? Routine Activity Theory provides the foundation for understanding crime and its patterns by focusing on variations in the convergence of offenders, targets and controllers in space and time. But Routine Activity Theory does not provide a full understanding of why the controllers may be absent or ineffective. This article expands Routine Activity Theory to explain controllers. It claims that the behaviors of controllers can be understood in the context of their relationship with super controllers – those who regulate controllers’ incentives to prevent crime. The article lists and describes types of super controllers. Drawing on a rational choice perspective and Situational Crime Prevention, the article examines the methods super controllers use to regulate the conduct of controllers. Examples are used throughout to illustrate specific points and to show the diversity of super controlling. This article concludes with a discussion of the implication of super controllers for the practice of crime prevention and research into crime reduction methods.

Security Journal

Date: June 30th, 2011
Cate: Consulting, crime analysis, Crime Prevention, Healthcare Security, Security

Hospital Security Articles

Over the past couple of years, Threat Analysis Group, LLC has published several articles on hospital security.  The articles address the security risk assessment process, in depth threat assessments, vulnerability analysis and security design consulting specifically for hospitals.  All of the articles are available free on our website:

 

Strategic Hospital Security

Hospital Threat Assessments

Vulnerability and Risk Assessments in the Environment of Care

Security Design Consulting

Date: June 16th, 2011
Cate: crime analysis, Crime Prevention, Security

Two Documents Address Crime Analysis and Metrics-Driven Decision Making

Two comprehensive documents address crime analysis as a tool for metrics/data-driven decision making.  While one is geared to law enforcement and the other is geared to security, both provide a sound foundation for using crime data in risk assessment process.

 

Crime Analysis for Problem Solvers in 60 Small Steps builds prepares you for different analytic roles as a key member of a problem-solving team. Indeed, the latest writings on problem-oriented policing see crime analysts as central to this new way of policing communities.

Crime Analysis for Problem Solvers in 60 Small Steps

 

Crime Analysis for Problem Solving Security Professionals in 25 Small Steps shows security professionals how to select and implement appropriate countermeasures to reduce the opportunities for the everyday crimes that are the most common threats to assets and targets that security professionals must protect. Drawing on problem-oriented policing and situational crime prevention the manual is essential reading for security professionals, facility managers, risk managers, property managers, and as well for both public and private police who are concerned with everyday crime problems in business settings.

Crime Analysis for Problem Solving Security Professionals in 25 Small Steps


Date: April 1st, 2011
Cate: Crime Prevention, Security

The Security Continuum

The Security Continuum includes four distinct security strategies – - – Deterrence, Prevention, Mitigation, and Investigation.

Deterrence is designed to discourage criminals by increasing their risks, promoting a sense of security, and instilling doubt.  A criminal who chooses not to commit a crime at your facility because of existing security measures is an example of criminal who has been deterred.

Prevention is the inability or increased difficulty to commit a crime because of security measures in place to protect an asset.  A criminal who is unable to break into a safe is an example of prevention.

Mitigation is the act of intervening in a crime to consequences of the crime once underway.  A security officer stopping a shoplifter at the door after the theft has been committed is an example of mitigation.

Investigation is the study of the crime, after it has been committed, to identify the perpetrator and bring him/her to justice.  Providing camera surveillance to law enforcement is a common first step of an investigation.

The Security Continuum dictates that:

- Not all crimes can be deterred

- More can be prevented

- Even more can be mitigated

- All can be investigated

As most security professionals know, measuring deterrence and prevention is difficult at best.  Mitigation and Investigation are far easier to measure and many organizations capture this data on a regular basis.  The problem with driving a security program solely with the easy-to-measure metrics is that subsequent remedial measures focus on further enhancements to mitigation and investigation measures (the known metrics).  For example, a facility that was unable to prevent a crime may spend significant resources on cameras to aid investigations, but insufficient measures which could have deterred or prevented the crime (such as good security procedures or access controls).  Alternatively, the organization may focus on the precise vulnerabilities that were exploited for the crime which occurred.  For example, if a safe was removed from the premises, the organization may replace the safe with a floor-bolted model, but disregard the building’s weak door controls which allowed the criminal access to the safe.

Which part of the Security Continuum is your program emphasizing?

 

Date: March 24th, 2011
Cate: Crime Prevention, Security

Another Perspective on Threats vs Vulnerabilities

A paper in the Journal of Physical Security defined threats and vulnerabilities as follows:

Threat: Who might attack against what assets, using what resources, with what goal in mind, when/where/why, and with what probability. There might also be included some general aspect of the nature of the attack (e.g., car bombing, theft of equipment, etc.), but not details about the attack or the security measures that must be defeated and the Vulnerabilities to be exploited.

Vulnerability: a specific weakness in security (or a lack of security measures) that typically could be exploited by multiple adversaries having a range of motivations and interest in a lot of different assets.

 

Being Vulnerable to the Threat of Confusing Threats with Vulnerabilities

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